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Abstract 
Online security is essential to any governmental e-service, and more so in cases when 
electronic identification is used to cast votes in elections or perform financial transactions. 
Recently, one of the most promising and disruptive innovations in improving the 
governance of data has been the introduction of blockchain (the technology underpinning 
Bitcoin). This thesis considers the costs of recoding X-road and Estonian Electronic 
Identity Software source codes into blockchain using the COCOMO II software cost 
estimation model. These costs are then used to calculate the return on security investment 
(ROSI). The results indicate that the potential security risks would have significantly 
higher costs compared to the to-be incurring costs of implementing blockchain recoding, 
meaning the ROSI would very strongly justify making the transition. This thesis aims to 
provide a tangible case for calculating the transfer costs to blockchain technology and 
evaluates the potential ROSI.  
 
Keywords: blockchain, ROSI, e-government, x-road, electronic identification, 
COCOMO.  
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the costs of recoding the source codes of both 
X-road, the data communication backbone, and eID, the electronic identification 
software, into blockchain and weigh these development costs against potential security 
breach costs, expressed in return on security investment (ROSI). The COCOMO II 
software development cost estimation tool will be used for the former and an existing 
method of estimating the return on investment in security software improvements for the 
latter.  
Firstly, the thesis provides a general introduction into blockchain technology and into the 
two products of Estonian e-government to be evaluated for transfer. The reasoning and 
novelty behind such transmission are considered and discussed.  
Secondly, a review of existing literature on transferring to blockchain as well as existing 
software cost models and various methods for calculating ROSI will be provided. The 
COCOMO II model is explained in further depth. 
The Data and Methodology section of the thesis will describe the assumptions that are 
used to evaluate the scope of the effort and to calculate the potential costs, but also to 
estimate the potential financial loss from security breach. It will also consider three 
scenarios in order to contemplate any cost cutting efforts for the transfer. ROSI is 
calculated and justifications are provided for the results. The ROSI is also compared to 
all data available from similar projects or approaches.  
Lastly, the author will draw conclusions on the results and provide input on the 
justifiability of the transfer to blockchain, and also any considerations to be pondered that 
may affect the results when implementing this transition in real life.  
Although software development cost estimation is a fairly mature topic, it is still 
extremely difficult to estimate accurately due to the quickly developing methods and 
strain of predicting the actual efforts to create the software. Similarly, decentralized 
database structure has existed for a while now, but only with the resurgence of blockchain 
based cryptocurrencies, has it become a more thoroughly researched topic. Return on 
investment in IT-solutions and costs of risk from potential security break-ins are vastly 
understudied and often inaccurate. Because this thesis considers blockchain technology 
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as a solution, it furthermore fills the existing gap in lack of adequate research in assessing 
transfer costs to blockchain technology for security purposes.  
Bitcoin (Nakamoto 2008), the much talked about cryptocurrency (Böhme et al. 2015: 
213-238, Popper 2015), has both been cheered as a revolutionary technology in finance 
and banking (Vigna & Casey 2015) and even called the ‘next internet’ (Brodbeck 2015), 
but also dismissed as hoax (Matthews 2014) and a house of cards about to be blown over 
(Bloomberg 2016). While speculation over the price of Bitcoin and arguments about its 
value as a currency continue, many still agree blockchain, the underlying technology 
behind Bitcoin, is the next big thing (Tapscott 2015, The Economist 2015, Swan 2015: 
vii). Blockchain could also be used as an underlying technology in forming smart 
contracts, which essentially allows both identification of the participant and agreement 
on a set of terms within the contract (Kosba et al. 2015). However, it’s not just the world 
of finance that blockchain is reshaping, but also the way third party verification is used 
as a whole in banking, real estate, health care and data management (The Economist 2015, 
Lavinskaya 2016, Mougayar 2014, Swan 2015: 40,76, UK Office for Science 2015: 14). 
Blockchain is a database, acting as a distributed ledger (Swanson 2015) with real time, 
nearly tamper-proof processing capability, which in addition is also increasingly low-cost 
(UK Office for Science 2015: 6). It has immense potential to revolutionize modus 
operandi of governments to provide their services (Naughton 2016). The reason for that 
is blockchain's ability to remove a single trusted third party from the verification process 
(Buterin 2015, Plassaras 2013, Back et al. 2014, Bissias et al. 2014). Many governments 
are already closely looking into policy-making for blockchain technologies and even 
encouraging people to use it (Baraniuk 2016).  
The first electronic identification system was introduced as early as the 1960’s (Enikeieff 
et al. 1965) and further improvements were patented in the late 1980’s, using simple pre-
established secret keys or personal identification codes (PIN’s), and was mainly used for 
approving fund transfers in ATM’s (Stein 1989). Although many improvements have 
since been introduced to the ID card holder’s verification process itself (e.g. fingerprints 
(Lane 1997) and biometrics (Berson & Zemlok 1995)), bio-information scanning 
technology is too expensive to be implemented into every household and also faces 
security concerns of its own.  
 6 
Target asset security is only as secure as the communication channel between the identity 
holder and the identity provider (Neumann 2013: 21-32). Carter and Bélanger (2005: 5-
25) claim that trustworthiness, alongside ease of use and compatibility, is a significant 
factor for a citizen to determine their use of governmental e-services and the success or 
acceptance of such services amongst the population. West (2004) also argues that privacy 
and security are clearly reflected as area of concern in surveys conducted in US about 
their use of e-government services.  
Estonia introduced X-road, the secure data transport backbone and various distributed 
software systems to create a common system for e-Government (Kalja et al. 2005). Ever 
since, the country has been the leading advocate of e-services and their digital signature 
and the identification system, which helps citizens to vote online, access digital health 
records and monitor any data inquires by the government, and has received a a great deal 
of praise in the mainstream media (Scott 2014, Mansel 2013). The e-state project has also 
caught on and countries such as Japan, Ukraine, Finland and Georgia have started 
collaboration to introduce similar digital revolutions to their citizens as well (ERR 2013, 
BNS 2015, e-Estonia.com 2015). Despite all the kind words, there are still recognizable 
issues with the system to be tackled (Deane 2003, Kitsing 2011).  
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2. Literature Review 
This section covers the three main components of the thesis – 1) coding to Blockchain, 
2) COCOMO II cost model and 3) ROSI and overview of existing research and 
publications.  
2.1.  Transition to Blockchain 
Blockchain is still very much an emerging technology and not much scientific literature 
is available on its properties, nor is there a wide range of case studies available for review. 
Consequently, it is difficult also to find any harmonized guidelines for implementing 
blockchain for diverse applications, and more so on a larger scale. There have however 
been a couple of experimental instructions (Czepluch et al. 2015, Spanos 2015) for 
attempts to code blockchain applications, but also much development of the method has 
been done by Ethereum, a decentralized platform for running smart contracts or 
applications run on a custom built blockchain.  
Vitalik Buterin (2013: 14-21), the founder of Ethereum, explains the code execution as: 
“an infinite loop that consists of repeatedly carrying out the operation at the current 
program counter (which begins at zero) and then incrementing the program counter by 
one, until the end of the code is reached or an error or STOP or RETURN instruction is 
detected.” Essentially though, the coding is still a series of instructions that in the case of 
blockchain are based around a logic of zero-knowledge proof (Buterin 2016). Therefore, 
one can examine the existing source code and assume certain additional efforts by 
programmers and developers to recode the existing code into blockchain.  
Use of the Ethereum mechanism is also encouraged by Czepluch et al. (2015: 3) on the 
basis of the transparency of the method, which allows accurate verification of the 
predicted transactions. Still, a notable concern is the scalability of the method, as current 
estimations and suggestions for large scale projects are only theories and are still untested, 
and the blockchain may become too large for an average user to carry a node on to the 
network (Czepluch et al. 2015: 60). Trent et al. (2016: 50-56) address this in their research 
and conclude that blockchain is capable of running a large scale decentralized database 
and offer a solution of their own in the form of BigchainDB as a building block within 
blockchain applications to run the database. 
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2.2. COCOMO II 
Computer programming cost estimation dates back to as early as the mid-60s (Nelson 
1966), which led to some first generation models in the late 60’s-early 70’s (Boehm et al. 
2000). The late 1970’s produced improved methods with SLIM, Checkpoint, PRICE-S, 
SEER and COCOMO models being produced (Boehm et al. 2000). Software 
development cost estimation has been a very difficult task to perform accurately, mainly 
due to the inability to accurately anticipate skill sets, unexpected additional tasks, change 
in set tasks connected to the fast pace of development in technology and pressures from 
managements to increase/decrease the estimates (Lederer & Prasad 1995). Regression-
based estimation techniques, such as COCOMO modelling, seem to dominate by far in 
use for all assessments (Jørgensen & Shepperd 2007), however a composite method 
introduced with the COCOMO II model in 1995 is more appropriate and precise for 
projects with top-level design in place (Boehm et al. 2000). The Post-Architecture model 
of the COCOMO II has also been calibrated with 161 projects from both the private and 
public sector, including also non-profit organizations (Boehm et al. 2000), making it most 
appropriate for the purpose of this thesis. 
COCOMO II (or COCOMO 2.0) uses source instructions (source code) and sets of five 
Scale Factors (SF) and 17 Cost Drivers or Effort Multipliers (EM) to determine the overall 
development costs of a project (USC 2000, Boehm et al. 1995) (Appendix1). This is best 
suited for software which already has developed its life-cycle architecture, validated its’ 
purpose and established a framework (Boehm et al. 1995). Because the X-road and 
Estonian Electronic Identity Software have already been up and running for some time 
and considered for mere alteration for purposes of recoding, the COCOMO 2.0 model fits 
well for the motivation of the thesis.   
Software cost drivers are also factors that capture the specifics of the software, which 
influence the effort that goes into creating the program and drive the costs (expressed in 
Person Months) (USC 2000). As with Scale Factors, each driver is given a rating from 
very low to extra high (with some exceptions - see Appendix 1). Special consideration 
should be given to the schedule factor, as the end effort is expressed in person months 
(PM) and therefore the schedule estimates and precedents have major importance in the 
result. 
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Project size is one the most important inputs in COCOMO II models and has a special 
cost driver, Exponent E (USC 2000). It is an aggregation of all five scale factors 
(Appendix 1). 
2.3. ROSI 
Several models have been proposed for calculation of returns on investment in IT-security 
(Cavusoglu et al. 2004, Al-Humaigani & Dunn 2003, Tsiakis & Pekos 2008, Sonnenreich 
2006). The majority of them concentrate on the potential risk and loss occurred, compared 
to the investment to be made towards higher security. Often, security considerations are 
a ‘what if’ scenario and executive decision makers concentrate too much on the bottom-
line scenarios (Sonnenreich 2006). From a managerial point of view, each investment 
(including security) also has to make sense financially, although often the intruders are 
not only financially motivated (Cavusoglu et al. 2004).  
Kramer et al. (2015: 186) indicate that finding errors and resolving them in the early 
stages of the development will significantly decrease the end costs of the project. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to invest in an error-checking labor force in the initial phase. 
Similarly, the ROSI models described by Tsalis et al. (2013: 133-134) factor in the efforts 
of mitigation in case of a security risk. Their case study offers a good example of 
calculating ROSI as it deals with transferring data to cloud service, considers the 
development costs and focuses on security controls (Tsalis et al. 2013: 136).  
Perhaps the best guidelines are provided by the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA 2012), who provide an introductory overview to the world of 
calculating the ROSI. The authors do emphasize that calculations are not about financial 
gain, but rather about prevention of loss (ENISA 2012: 2). The report also indicates the 
potential drawbacks of estimating ROSI, namely that it is a result of many 
approximations, and advise to refer to historic data on specific cases, even though they 
can be difficult to come by as companies are reluctant to share that information (ENISA 
2012: 7). There are models, such as White Paper on Measuring the Return on IT Security 
Investments from Intel (Rosenquist 2007: 5), which do provide a scalable model, but also 
rely on the method of using large amounts of historic data from previous incidents, which 
couldn’t be applied across the board for all cases. 
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Return on investment in security differs from regular ROI calculations. Rather than 
counting the benefits, the avoided cost in data breach is compared to the cost of 
investment (Booz et al. 2014). In order to calculate the ROSI, a potential threat should 
also be assumed. For the purposes of this thesis, ROSI will be calculated assuming a 
malicious outside cyber attack on the system, that is within the frameworks of similar 
attacks on large corporations or governmental institutions.  
In order to calculate the ROSI or Return on Security Investment, one should estimate the 
costs of countermeasures (CC), i.e., the cost of solution (SC) and evaluate the Annual 
Loss Expectancy (ALE) (Sonnenreich 2006, ENISA 2012):  
!"#$ = 	 '()	×	%!,-.	/,0,12034 − 	#6780,69	:6-0#6780,69	:6-0  
Percentage of Risk Mitigation (%Risk Mitigated) reflects the proportion of attacks the 
solution is intended to address.  
A basic formula to capture the costs of data breach is: 
ALE (Annual Loss Expectancy) = SLE (Single Loss Expectancy) ×ARO (Annualized 
Rate of Occurrence) (Stuntz 2014, Krause & Tipton 1993). 
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) expresses the monetary impact of a single event or threat 
(Krause & Tipton 1993) and is defined as: 
SLE = ASSET VALUE × EXPOSURE FACTOR  
Whereas, exposure factor is a measure of extent of the loss expressed in percentage.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
In order to estimate the total costs of the development at hand, the following steps should 
be made: 
1) Identify the total volume of the existing source code.  
2) Identify and assign scale factors and effort multipliers based on the 
specifications given in the COCOMO II guidelines and provided in Appendix 1. 
3) Calculate the amount of source code to be recoded in order to work on 
blockchain. 
4) Calculate the total effort that would go into the recoding.  
5) Calculate how much time it would take to put in this effort. 
6) Calculate how much it would cost to put in this effort. 
Additionally, several approaches will be identified in this section which could reduce the 
cost for development and recommendations for prior actions will be given that could 
produce the most cost effective results. 
3.1. Existing source code 
For the purposes of this thesis, a total of twenty repositories available for public access 
(Population Register Center 2016, Riigi Infosüsteemi Amet (RIA) 2016) with the source 
code for the X-road and Electronic Identity Software, were used. X-Road is the software 
that facilitates information transfer between parties and the Electronic Identity Software 
manages the requests and adds signatures (validity) to documents once electronically 
signed. The software also includes a digidoc program, which is downloaded onto the 
users’ PC to sign documents. The following depositories were used: 
1) \browser-token-signing-master 
2) \esteid-pkcs11-master 
3) \libdigidoc-master 
4) \ndigidoc-master 
5) \chrome-token-signing-master 
6) \esteid-tokend-master 
7) \google-breakpad-r1403 
8) \libdigidocpp-master 
9) \minidriver-master 
10) \qdigidoc-master  
11) \qesteidutil-master 
12) \qt-common-master 
13) \smartcardpp-master 
14) \updater-master 
15) \digidoc4j-master 
16) \dss-hwcrypto-demo-master 
17) \jdigidoc-master 
18) \pdf-validator-master 
19) \sd-dss-master 
20) \xroad-public-maste
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These folders were then analyzed for the total count of SLOCs (Source Lines of Code) 
with the LocMetrics counting tool. For the purposes of this thesis, the total amount of 
Executable Logical (SLOC-L) code lines will be used for calculations, as this indicator 
best reflects the actual content to be revised (removing blank lines, comment lines and 
singular symbol lines) (Nguyen et al. 2007). The total number of Executable Logical 
SLOC’s to be used is 222623 (Figure 1: LocMetrics Count of Source Lines of Code).  
 
Figure 1: LocMetrics Count of Source Lines of Code (compiled by the author) 
The largest folders with the source data are Breakpad (a crash-reporting library) with 
21%, EstEID Tokend (Tokend library for EstEID smartcards) with 16% and X-Road 
Public (backbone of e-Estonia) and SD-DSS (eSignature creation and validation tool), 
each covering 14% of the total codes (Figure 2: SLOC-L Distribution). 
 
Figure 2: SLOC-L Distribution (compiled by the author) 
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The programming language should also be considered, as not only can the effort to recode 
differ, but so can the average salaries (CV-Online OÜ 2016). Over all the repositories, 
the most prominent languages are C++ and Java (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
The following assumptions for the source code are made for larger software developments 
and will also be applied herein (USC 2000): 
1) REVL (% of code thrown away due to requirements evolution and volatility) 
– 10% 
2) DM (Design Modified) – 10% (minimal design change to accommodate data 
placement into blocks) 
3) CM (Code Modified) – 25% (moderate code change to account for re-design 
of security elements and identity verification)  
4) IM (Integration Required) – 50% (integration to devices largely similar to 
existing) 
42%
5%
51%
2%
SLOC	Languages
Java C C++ C#
Figure 3: SLOC Languages (compiled by the author) 
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5) Assessment and Assimilation (AA) – 6% - considerable module Test and 
Evaluation (T&E), documentation 
6) Software understanding (SU) – 30 % - nominal understanding.  
7) Programmer unfamiliarity (UNFM) – 0,4 – somewhat familiar.  
3.2. Determining Scale Factors and Effort Multipliers 
Based on the characteristics provided in Appendix 1, each scale and factor will be 
assigned with a rating for all calculative considerations in this thesis (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: COCOMO II Scale Factor and Cost Driver ratings (compiled by the author)
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4. Results and Discussions 
4.1. Source Lines of Code 
Based on Formula ASLOC (Adapted Source Lines of Code) = AAM × Reused Volume 
(USC 2000),  
AAM= AA+AAF[1+(0.2×SU×UNFM)], 
where 
AAF=[(0.4 × DM) + (0.3 × CM) + 0.3 × IM)]  
and 
Reused Volume (RV) = SLOC + REVL   
Therefore,  
AAF = [(0.4×10) + (0.3×25) + (0.3×50)] = 26.5 % 
Which gives AAM= 0.06+0.265×[1+(0.02×0.3×0.4)] = 0.325636 
Because for this project it is estimated that a total of 10% of all code will be reused, the 
TOTAL Reused Volume = 222623 + 10% = 244885, however since each language is 
calculated as a separate module, the same should be done for ASLOC volume as well, as 
COCOMO II rounds up only to full lines of code (USC 2000). Based on the total SLOC 
counts per language (Figure 3), the following breakdown will be used for calculations: 
Language	 SLOC	 Reused	Volume	(RV)	
Java	 93108	 102419	
C	 12490	 13739	
C++	 112872	 124159	
C#	 4153	 4568	
Total	 222623	 244885	
Figure 5: Number of reused volume of SLOC's by language 
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ASLOCJava = 0.325636×102419 = 33351 
ASLOCC = 0.325636×13739 = 4473 
ASLOCC++ = 0.325636×124159 = 40430  
ASLOCC# = 0.325636×4568 = 1487 
Thus,  
ASLOCTOTAL = 33351 + 4473 + 40430 + 1487 = 79 741 
4.2. Exponent Factor E 
Because exponent factor E has a formula of (USC 2000): 
 
 
 
And previously determined ratings for Scale Factors establish the following multipliers 
Appendix 1.2): 
As, 
PREC SF1 = 2.48 
FLEX SF2 = 1.01 
RESL SF3 = 4.24 
TEAM SF4 = 3.29 
PMAT SF5 = 4.68  
 
then 
E = 0.91+0.01× (2.48+1.01+4.24+3.29+4.68) = 1.067 
Because E > 1.0, the project experiences slight diseconomies of scale (USC 2000). 
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4.3. Effort Multipliers 
COCOMO II uses a multiplication of all Effort Multipliers (EM) that influence the effort 
made, therefore: 
EM16 = 1.10×1.14×1×1.15×1×0.85×0.88×1×0.88×1×1×1×1×1×1×0.86=0.81635 
EM17 or SCED applies for the whole project, and therefore will be accounted for 
separately in the Schedule Estimation chapter (USC 2000), however 
EM17=0.81635×1.14 = 0.9306 
4.4. Schedule Estimation 
The model foresees the schedule calculation as the amount of nominal schedule calendar 
time to development (TDEVNS), which has the formula of (USC 2000, Yang et al. 2008):  
 
The SCED%, at a ‘low’ rating is measured to be 85% of the nominal schedule. However 
with the improvements in software developments since 2000, it is estimated for the value 
at present day to be off by 3% on average in actual projects (Yang et al. 2008). In case of 
the ‘low’ rating, the SCED% should be decreased by 3% (Yang et al. 2008), making it a 
value of 82%. 
The formula includes nominal schedule Person Months (PMNS) for effort, which is 
calculated as (USC 2000): 
, 
where 1 Person Month = 152 hours per month (USC 2000). 
As A=2.94, B=0.91, C=3.67 and D=0.28 for COCOMO II calibration (USC 2000),  
and Size is expressed in KSLOC (Thousands of Source Lines of Code) and is equal to 
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KSLOC = 79.741 
 then, 
PMNS = 2.94 × (79.741) 1.067×0.9306=292.6 
Consequently,  
TDEVNS=3.67x(292.6) (0.28+0.2x(1.067-0.91) ×0.82 = 3.67x(292.6)0.3114 ×0.82= 17.6 
Since the Total effort required (PMNS) is 292,6 and the time to develop (TDEVNS) is 17.6 
months, that means it would take 292.6/17.6=16.7 people 17.6 months to complete the 
project. 
4.5. Effort Costs 
In order to calculate the effort for each module, it is necessary to consider each modules’ 
contribution to the overall effort: 
 
Therefore, 
PMJava = 292.6 × (33351/79741) = 122.3578 
PMC = 292.6 × (4473/79741) = 16.4105 
PMC++= 292.6 × (40430/79741) = 148.3292 
PMC# = 292.6 × (1487/79741) = 5.4554 
The average gross salaries in Estonia for programmers in the languages relevant to this 
case study are 1606 EUR per month for a Java programmer, 1434 EUR/month for C, 1568 
EUR/month for C# and 1813 EUR/month for C++ programmer (CV-Online OÜ 2016).  
Considering the total out of pocket costs for the employer (i.e. the salary fund, roughly 
an additional 33.8% from social and unemployment taxes), the average salary of each 
programmer and the total effort in Person Months (PM), the total costs of each module 
are: 
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Java – 2148 EUR × 122.3578 = 262 825 EUR 
C – 1919 EUR × 16.4105 = 31 492 EUR 
C++ – 2425  EUR × 148.3292 = 359 698 EUR 
C# - 2097 EUR × 5.4554 = 11 440 EUR 
Using the COCOMO II software development cost estimation tool, the total baseline cost 
of recoding X-Road and Estonian Electronic Identity Software to blockchain, would then 
in sum be: Solution Cost (SC)= 262 825 + 31 492 + 359 698 + 11 440 = 665 455 EUR. 
4.6. Scenarios 
Some cost drivers and scale factors can affect the total costs more significantly than others 
(Appendix 2). As seen from Appendix 2, underestimating the pressure of meeting the 
scheduled deadline for example can increase the costs of the project by over 25%. These 
factors however help to recognize most the influential cost drivers and identify the 
potential for cost-saving.  
4.6.1. Scenario A: 
The most significant cost savings would derive from hiring higher-capability analysts 
(Appendix 2). Bringing the capability of the team of analysts (ACAP) from the current 
75th percentile (high) to 90th percentile (very high) would cut the costs of the whole project 
by over 16%, or just under 110 000 EUR. Naturally, extra training for staff would 
introduce some new occurring costs as well. There are a variety of online courses 
available from prominent universities such as MIT, Princeton University, Duke 
University and Stanford, that introduce the basics of blockchain (Holmes 2015). For a 10 
week course, the price tag ranges from $3200-3600 (Holmes 2015). There are also free 
courses available from Bitcoin University and Coursera (Coursera 2016, Blockchain 
University 2016).  
Sending a 3-member team of analysts to 2 courses prior to starting the project would end 
up costing around 22 000 USD or 19 000 EUR in course fees + 10 000 EUR in 
flights/accommodation. Yet, assuming the course can bring the capability of the 
personnel to the required 90th percentile, it will still lower the total cost of the software 
development by 81 000 EUR and bring the total cost down to 584 455 EUR.  
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4.6.2. Scenario B 
The second most effective way to reduce costs is to increase the capability of the 
programmers involved in the project (PCAP) (Appendix 2). Since Java and C++ are 
overwhelmingly the dominant languages used in the project, 10 programmers (Six C++ 
and four Java programmers) are assumed to receive access to the same trainings as in 
Scenario A. Therefore, the cost of training fees for the necessary 10 programmers would 
be ($3500 × 2 courses × 10 people) = $70 000 or about 60 000 €. With an additional 20 
000 EUR for flights and accommodation, total out of pocket costs for such training would 
be 80 000 EUR 
The respective savings from increasing the capability of the programmers from high (75th 
percentile) to very high (90th percentile) would be: 
		 Baseline	 PCAP	very	high	 Difference	
Java	 262 825 € 226	976	€	 -35	849	€	
C++	 359 698 € 310	635	€	 -49	063	€	
Total	 	  -84	912	€	
Figure 6: Cost savings from PCAP increase on Java and C++ modules to 90th percentile 
(composed by the author). 
 
Therefore implementing training only for programmers would cost about 80 000 €, but 
reduce the overall costs by only 4 912 €.  
4.6.3. Scenario C 
Considering savings from both Scenario A and Scenario B, it would make sense to assume 
that it would be beneficial to have both the necessary programmers (10) and the team of 
analysts (3) receive extra training in blockchain programming and software development 
to bring the capabilities of both teams to 90th percentile.  
The training costs for both analysts and programmers will a total of (based on calculations 
in Scenario A and Scenario B) 109 000 EUR, however the total project costs would go 
down significantly: 
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 Baseline PCAP and ACAP very high Difference 
Java 262 825 € 189 608 € -73 217 € 
C 31 492 € 26 306 € -5 186 € 
C++ 359 698 € 259 494 € -100 204 € 
C# 11 440 € 9556 € -1 884 € 
Total 665 455 € 484 964 -180 491 € 
Figure 7: Cost savings from increase of PCAP on Java and C++ modules and ACAP  to  
90th percentile (composed by the author). 
 
Still, considering the initial spending for training (109 000 €), the total savings from 
Scenario C would be 180 491 € - 109 000 € = 71 491 €, with total project costs at 593 
964 €.  
Comparing all possible scenarios (Figure 9), Scenario A, where only investments to 
increase ACAP were made, reduces the overall costs of the project the most.  
  Costs Reduction in costs 
Baseline 665 455 € - 
Scenario A 584 455 € 81 000 € 
Scenario B 660 543 € 4 912 € 
Scenario C 593 964 € 71 491 € 
Figure 8: Comparison of cost savings from increased ACAP and PCAP ratings 
(composed by the author). 
  
 22 
5. Return On Security Investment 
Solution Costs and calculations are provided in chapter 4. Results and Discussions. 
In order to determine the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE), the values of Annualized Rate 
of Occurrence (ARO), Exposure Factor (EF) and Asset Value (AV) should also be 
concluded, as:  
ALE = SLE × ARO 
and 
SLE = AV × EF.  
Firstly, to find the Single Loss Expectancy (SLE), a total value of the asset should be 
determined. Because of the scale of the program and its budgetary distribution amongst 
several different departments of the government, such as the Information System 
Authority (RIA), IT and Development Centre of the Ministry of the Interior and 
Certification Centre Ltd., it is rather complex to give an accurate measurement for the 
value of the given asset – the X-road technology and Electronic Identity Software, more 
so because some benefits, such as savings on time, paper and fuel are deemed priceless.   
 Figure	10:	RIA	cost	and	benefit	analysis	(Kiivet	2015)  
In 2013, RIA ran a cost and benefits analysis on the whole digital identification and e-
signatures service for the upcoming 10 years (Figure 10: RIA cost and benefit analysis). 
According to their own estimations, over the given time, the services would cost €89 M 
and bring in benefits in the amount of €487 M, excluding any benefits from saving natural 
Costs 
Creation of the document       € 36M 
Electronic certification         €11M
Issuing             €9M
Base software                      €5M
User-support            €3M
Support in applications        €25M 
                                                                                    TOTAL                    €89 M 
 Benefits 
State fees          €40M
Cost savings on digital vs physical signature                 €251M 
Cost savings on identification                      €196M
Paper and fuel savings               priceless 
                                                                                    TOTAL                   €487 M 
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resources. The value may be even higher as of the present day due to unexpected success 
of the e-services. In 2015, the head of the IT-department for Estonian Health Insurance 
Fund (Haigekassa) Raimo Laus stated that the use of e-prescriptions is facilitating a 
reduction in costs of about 22M € per annum (Matson 2015).  
If a significant attack occurs on the identification process, the core trust of the digital 
signature process will suffer, potentially even inducing a switch back to physical services. 
Based on the report, the value of the electronic identification and digital signature system 
can be expressed through the benefit of having it in place instead of physical identification 
and signing process. Hence, 
ASSET VALUE = €487M – €89M = €398M over the span of 10 years. 
Exposure factor is calculated by subtraction from full 100% of various characteristics and 
their value (e.g. 30% will be deducted for having redundancies/back-up copies of the files, 
5% will be deducted due to the presence of a firewall etc.) (Tan 2002). However, because 
one of the major inputs in calculating ROSI, that the SLE is dependent on the Exposure 
Factor and exposure depends on the type of attack, time to discovery, security measures 
at the target department and various other aspects, a matrix with a full scale of exposure 
will be provided in this thesis, to better understand the impact of the investment in case 
of all types of attacks.       
X-Road was first introduced in 2001 and hasn’t experienced any major security breaches 
in the 15 years of its operation. The series of cyber attacks in 2007 were mainly DDOS 
(Distributed Denial of Services) targeting websites, rather than the X-road itself (Nazario 
2007). Several precautionary measures were introduced after the attacks, to further 
improve the security of the system. Regardless, it would only take one similar attack on 
X-road to significantly compromise the services. Because the SLE assumes the value of 
the project for 10 years, it would be pertinent to also assume a potential attack within 
those ten years for the purposes of calculating the ROSI.  
Thus, the Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO) will be 1/10 or 10%. 
The last variable in the formula, the % of risk mitigated, is similarly to the exposure factor 
very much dependent on the scale and type of the attack and the target database. 
Furthermore, the last variable is implicated with the extent of how the blockchain method 
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is applied and dependent on the success of being able to predict the weakest security 
factors in the data processing chain. In case of a smaller cyberattack such as DoS (Denial 
of Service) to a small database, the costs (or rather lack of benefits during the off-time) 
may not be significant, however in case delicate data in vast quantities is stolen, the 
impact is significantly higher. Therefore, various values of the % of Risk Mitigated will 
also be reflected further on in the thesis. 
For example, the ROSI for Scenario A provided in section 4.6 Approaches, with an 
Exposure Factor of 30% and Risk Mitigated of 85% (as described by Sonnenreich (2006: 
61)), is based on the ROSI formula provided in 2. Literature Review as follows: 
!"#$ = 	 '()	×	0.85 − 	584	455	584	455	  
As  
ALE = SLE × ARO 
and 
SLE = AV × EF, 
then, 
ALE = 398 000 000 × 0.3 × 0.1 = 11 940 000 
and thus, !"#$ = 	 11	940	000	×	0.85 − 	584	455		584	455	 = 16.364 = 1636.5	% 
The results in Table 1 indicate that, when considering the whole X-road platform and the 
electronic identity software, the investment in security software that could prevent even 
a smaller attack would bring in meaningful returns on investment. Only in cases when 
both Exposure Factor (EF) and % of Risk Mitigated are 10% or lower would the 
investment yield negative return on investment.  
Assuming adequate research into the rebuilding process is done and the security solution 
works as intended, a fixed value of 85% for Risk Mitigated can be assigned, as proposed 
by Sonnenreich (2006: 61). As mentioned prior, the value of the asset is difficult to 
estimate and the initial data involves all of the usage value across Electronic Identity 
Software and X-road implementation. Therefore, in order to provide an authentic 
perception on potential ROSI, the asset value impact on the ROSI will be observed (Table 
2) 
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 Table 1. Return on Security Investment calculation matrix (composed by the author) 
 
Table 2: ROSI with assumed 85% risk mitigation (composed by the author). 
    Exposure Factor 
Value 
(M€) 
10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 100.00% 
V
al
ue
 A
Ss
et
 
50% 199 189.4% 478.8% 768.2% 1057.7% 1347.1% 1636.5% 1925.9% 2215.3% 2504.7% 2794.1% 
60% 238.8 247.3% 594.6% 941.9% 1289.2% 1636.5% 1983.8% 2331.1% 2678.4% 3025.7% 3373.0% 
70% 278.6 305.2% 710.4% 1115.5% 1520.7% 1925.9% 2331.1% 2736.3% 3141.4% 3546.6% 3951.8% 
80% 318.4 363.1% 826.1% 1289.2% 1752.3% 2215.3% 2678.4% 3141.4% 3604.5% 4067.6% 4530.6% 
90% 358.2 420.9% 941.9% 1462.8% 1983.8% 2504.7% 3025.7% 3546.6% 4067.6% 4588.5% 5109.5% 
100% 398 478.8% 1057.7% 1636.5% 2215.3% 2794.1% 3373.0% 3951.8% 4530.6% 5109.5% 5688.3% 
110% 437.8 536.7% 1173.4% 1810.1% 2446.9% 3083.6% 3720.3% 4357.0% 4993.7% 5630.4% 6267.1% 
120% 477.6 594.6% 1289.2% 1983.8% 2678.4% 3373.0% 4067.6% 4762.2% 5456.8% 6151.4% 6846.0% 
130% 517.4 652.5% 1405.0% 2157.4% 2909.9% 3662.4% 4414.9% 5167.4% 5919.8% 6672.3% 7424.8% 
140% 557.2 710.4% 1520.7% 2331.1% 3141.4% 3951.8% 4762.2% 5572.5% 6382.9% 7193.3% 8003.6% 
150% 597 768.2% 1636.5% 2504.7% 3373.0% 4241.2% 5109.5% 5977.7% 6846.0% 7714.2% 8582.4% 
 
ROSI (%) 
Exposure Factor 
10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 100.00% 
%
 o
f R
is
k 
M
iti
ga
te
d 
10% -31.9% 36.2% 104.3% 172.4% 240.5% 308.6% 376.7% 444.8% 512.9% 581.0% 
20% 36.2% 172.4% 308.6% 444.8% 581.0% 717.2% 853.4% 989.6% 1125.8% 1262.0% 
30% 104.3% 308.6% 512.9% 717.2% 921.5% 1125.8% 1330.1% 1534.3% 1738.6% 1942.9% 
40% 172.4% 444.8% 717.2% 989.6% 1262.0% 1534.3% 1806.7% 2079.1% 2351.5% 2623.9% 
50% 240.5% 581.0% 921.5% 1262.0% 1602.4% 1942.9% 2283.4% 2623.9% 2964.4% 3304.9% 
60% 308.6% 717.2% 1125.8% 1534.3% 1942.9% 2351.5% 2760.1% 3168.7% 3577.3% 3985.9% 
70% 376.7% 853.4% 1330.1% 1806.7% 2283.4% 2760.1% 3236.8% 3713.5% 4190.2% 4666.8% 
80% 444.8% 989.6% 1534.3% 2079.1% 2623.9% 3168.7% 3713.5% 4258.2% 4803.0% 5347.8% 
90% 512.9% 1125.8% 1738.6% 2351.5% 2964.4% 3577.3% 4190.2% 4803.0% 5415.9% 6028.8% 
100% 581.0% 1262.0% 1942.9% 2623.9% 3304.9% 3985.9% 4666.8% 5347.8% 6028.8% 6709.8% 
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The calculations from Table 2 clearly indicate that as long as a reasonable assumption 
can be placed on the functionality of the technology, even in case of a single attack with 
a low exposure rate, the transition provides high rates of ROSI.  
Because ROSI is often evaluated on a smaller scale, it is difficult to draw appropriate 
comparisons from scientific literature. Most of the time, the ROSI % remains within the 
range of few hundreds of percentages (Sonnenreich: 2006, 46, ENISA 2012: 5), however 
because of the scale and sensitivity (civil liability) of the given project, it is logical to 
assume larger result on ROSI as well. The investment to be made is connected to the size 
of the platforms and software handling data and not necessarily to the data itself, however 
losses are accounted for based on the loss of data or denial of services. Hence, there’s a 
certain scalability already built into the investment. 
 These result seem rather high for a regular ROI, however this is mostly the case in 
security investments, when it only takes one coordinated attack to make the value of the 
asset plummet (Kolochenko 2015). It’s also noteworthy to mention the notion of Gordon 
& Loeb (2002: 122) that the optimal amount to spend on security investment should never 
exceed 37% of the potential loss and that in fact it is rarely ever the case. Based on this 
statement and the highly favorable ROSI , it is deeply recommended to transfer X-road 
and eID systems onto blockchain.  
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6. Conclusion  
The purpose of this thesis was to provide a first real case scenario of transfer to blockchain 
technology for database management, to estimate the development cost and the return on 
security investment (ROSI).  
This thesis analyzed the potential costs of transition of a database to blockchain, which 
in itself is a very poorly researched subject. Understandably, with the development of 
blockchain technology and improvement in cost calculation models, the accuracy will 
improve and this thesis sheds light on a dimension of the research which has not been 
shown before.  
Transfer to blockchain is still a work in progress and hence not much scientific literature 
is available, particularly with real-life examples. There is a strategy proposed by 
Ethereum (Buterin 2013) to develop blockchain applications which helps to transition 
from the current code to blockchain. Many experts agree that Ethereum is a solid base on 
which to build the transfer, but also admit the unprecedented scalable examples (Czepluch 
et al. 2015).  
Software cost estimation has been a well practiced occupation, however it still lacks 
accuracy despite many different estimation models such as SLIM, Checkpoint, PRICE-
S, SEER and COCOMO. The latter has been by far the most dominant, especially with 
the next generation model COCOMO II (Jørgensen & Shepperd 2007). The model uses 
the source code and a variety of scale factors and cost multipliers that help to shape the 
estimation of total effort that would go into the particular development. It then accounts 
for the schedule implications and local labor fees to estimate the total cost of development 
(USC 2000).  
Despite numerous models for calculating ROSI, many of them also struggle with 
scalability or have to rely on sets of historic data (Rosenquist 2007, Sonnenreich 2006). 
It is also noted that investing in error detection and eliminating mistakes in code writing 
in the early stages will help to save the costs of development (Kramer et al. 2015).  
The thesis assesses various scenarios for transfering the Estonian Electronic Identity 
Software and the data communication platform X-road to blockchain and estimates that 
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with certain investments into the capability of the programmers (participation in training) 
before initiating the project, the total cost of the effort would be 437 515 EUR.  
It then provides calculative proof that, in the majority of the cases, the investment would 
be worthwhile, as only few incidences where the potential attack would have a very low 
exposure rate (around 10%) will yield a negative return on the investment. Furthermore, 
similar conclusions can be drawn, even if the value of the asset is 50% of the total value 
assumed by RIA itself, providing a great example of scalability for calculating ROSI.   
This thesis provides the first case of considering technology transfer costs in the case of 
transitioning to blockchain technology and studies financial gains (ROSI) for the 
consideration. It also estimates ROSI on a very large governmental project, thus 
improving the level of scalability for both software development costs and ROSI models. 
Additionally, it provides a sense of cost implication of security investments for RIA, the 
Estonian Information System Authority, and hopefully some encouragement to consider 
novel technologies and justifications for large scale investments for security 
considerations.  
The study also has some limitations. The actual cost of maintaining the digital 
identification platform and e-government programs are hard to trace, because of their 
span over several ministries and organizations. Thus it is also difficult to estimate the true 
value of the asset. Similarly, the study operates under the assumption that blockchain 
technology is indeed as big an improvement in the security and transparency as many 
estimate it to be. Despite several papers and studies that theorize the usage and benefits 
of blockchain technology and success in cryptocurrencies or even small scale data 
management applications, the true tests of the technology are still ahead. Organizations 
such as Ethereum, SAFEnetwork and Open Garden have put forward some very 
promising applications for the use of blockchain technology, but until the usage rates go 
higher and they are able to operate on very large scales, it is impossible to tell for sure 
whether the technology is applicable for such pan-national usage.  
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Appendix 1    
Appendix 1.1  COCOMO II Scale factors (COCOMO II User manual: pp 74)  
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Appendix 1.2 COCOMO II Scale factors (COCOMO II User manual: pp 73) 
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Appendix 1.3. COCOMO II Scale factors (COCOMO II User manual: pp 75) 
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Appendix 2 
 Summary of changes by one category per each SF/CD (composed by the author) 
Scale	Factor/	Cost	Driver	 Change	in	Range	 Cost	 Change	%	
SCHED	 Down	 834	746,75	€		 125,44%	
ACAP	 Down	 782	907,81	€		 117,65%	
CPLX	 Up	 778	582,35	€		 117,00%	
PVOL	 Up	 765	273,25	€		 115,00%	
RELY	 Up	 762	278,70	€		 114,55%	
PCAP	 Down	 756	223,06	€		 113,64%	
APEX	 Down	 756	223,06	€		 113,64%	
DATA	 Up	 747	172,87	€		 112,28%	
PCON	 Down	 745	309,60	€		 112,00%	
DOCU	 Up	 738	655,05	€		 111,00%	
TIME	 Up	 738	655,05	€		 111,00%	
LTEX	 Down	 725	345,95	€		 109,00%	
PLEX	 Down	 725	345,95	€		 109,00%	
TOOL	 Down	 725	345,95	€		 109,00%	
SITE	 Down	 719	623,04	€		 108,14%	
RUSE	 Up	 717	560,13	€		 107,83%	
STOR	 Up	 698	727,75	€		 105,00%	
PMAT	 Down	 679	096,83	€		 102,05%	
RESL	 Down	 677	765,92	€		 101,85%	
PREC	 Down	 676	301,92	€		 101,63%	
TEAM	 Down	 674	971,01	€		 101,43%	
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FLEX	 Down	 674	372,10	€		 101,34%	
Baseline	 		 665	455,00	€		 100,00%	
FLEX	 Up	 656	737,54	€		 98,69%	
TEAM	 Up	 656	005,54	€		 98,58%	
PREC	 Up	 654	807,72	€		 98,40%	
RESL	 Up	 653	343,72	€		 98,18%	
PMAT	 Up	 652	079,35	€		 97,99%	
RUSE	 Down	 619	139,33	€		 93,04%	
SITE	 Up	 619	006,24	€		 93,02%	
APEX	 Up	 612	551,33	€		 92,05%	
DOCU	 Down	 605	564,05	€		 91,00%	
LTEX	 Up	 605	564,05	€		 91,00%	
PLEX	 Up	 605	564,05	€		 91,00%	
RELY	 Down	 604	965,14	€		 90,91%	
PCON	 Up	 598	909,50	€		 90,00%	
TOOL	 Up	 598	909,50	€		 90,00%	
SCHED	 Up	 583	737,13	€		 87,72%	
DATA	 Down	 583	737,13	€		 87,72%	
CPLX	 Down	 578	945,85	€		 87,00%	
PVOL	 Down	 578	945,85	€		 87,00%	
PCAP	 Up	 574	686,94	€		 86,36%	
ACAP	 Up	 555	854,56	€		 83,53%	
TIME	 Down	 N/A	 N/A	
STOR	 Down	 N/A	 N/A	
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